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Abstract: Scholars have long debated how best to understand Nietzsche’s “great 
politics.” But they have hitherto neglected Nietzsche’s own suggestion that Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra (Z) provides a “formula” for it. This article thus provides a 
fresh interpretation of “great politics” based on a reading of Z. It argues that 
“great politics” is concerned above all with the question of how to overcome 
humankind in its present form. Such overcoming does not have a specific goal. 
Rather, Z suggests that a continuous overcoming of the present is required in 
order to remain attuned to the nature of life itself and allow for human flourish-
ing. In the “new peoples” Nietzsche anticipates, politics would take on a form 
that radically revalues many foundational assumptions of political philosophy. 
In offering a new understanding of “great politics,” this article therefore also 
suggests an answer to the question whether and in what sense Nietzsche is a 
political philosopher.
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1.
[. . .] Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for the highest 
act of humanity’s self-reflection, an act that has become flesh and 
genius in me. [. . .] I am a bearer of glad tidings as no one ever was 
before; I am acquainted with incredibly elevated tasks, where even 
the concept of these tasks has been lacking so far; only from me 
onwards are there new hopes. With all this I am at the same time 
necessarily a man of calamity. Because when truth begins to fight 
with the lies of millennia there will be tremors, a convulsion of 
earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys such as no one 
has ever imagined. The concept of politics will then have merged 
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entirely into a war of spirits, all power structures of the old society 
will have exploded—they are all based on lies: there will be wars 
such as have never existed on earth. It is only beginning with me 
that there is on earth great politics.—
2.
Do you want a formula for a destiny like this, one that becomes a 
human being?—You will find it in my Zarathustra.
—EH “Destiny” 1–2 (translation altered)1
This article sets out to take seriously and develop in detail what Nietzsche 
might have meant when referring to Zarathustra as a “formula” for his 
“great politics.” Despite the quote given as an epigraph above, and despite 
the fact that Nietzsche thought of Z as his most important work, indeed as 
the “greatest gift” humanity has ever received (EH Preface), the book has 
so far received little attention by those trying to understand and articulate 
Nietzsche’s “great politics.” Presumably this has to do with the fact that Z 
is very unlike other works of political philosophy.2 Nietzsche’s status as a 
political philosopher, Z’s status as a work of political philosophy, and the 
question of “great politics” are in fact best approached together, as aspects 
of the same problem. Nietzsche is and is not a political philosopher: He 
is not, insofar as he does not comply with the criteria typically taken to 
be essential for qualifying as one. But more importantly, he is a political 
philosopher insofar as he employs the categories of political philosophy to 
revalue them and to create new ones that are appropriate to the task of 
a future politics. Several such conceptual innovations lay the foundation 
to Nietzsche’s “great politics.” But the most central revaluation Nietzsche 
introduces in his Z is a shift from self-preservation to self-overcoming. Z’s 
contribution to political philosophy is less obvious, but all the more cru-
cial for a proper understanding of Nietzsche’s political thought: “Great 
politics” as it emerges in Z is at its core about the possibility of collective 
self-overcoming. As such, it does not have a concrete, unified goal. This 
does not mean that there is no political program implied in Z; rather, the 
political program of great politics is precisely continuous self-overcoming.
If and when we take seriously that Z is to be a formula for “great politics,” 
then, it becomes clear that Nietzsche’s vision for a future politics is very dif-
ferent from the one often ascribed to him. Rather than looking forward to 
“the emergence of a master race that will rule the earth” or advocating the 
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“unification of Europe,”3 Z suggests the local development of “new peoples” 
beyond the modern state (Z III: “Old and New Tablets”). Such peoples’ ori-
enting thought shifts from the securing of collective human survival to the 
continuous overcoming of humankind (Z IV: “Higher Man”). The found-
ing of “new peoples” in Z is based on a process of self-overcoming and the 
cultivation of creative capacities in individuals. Insofar as it develops first 
individually via exodus from the modern state, then locally and from the 
bottom up, Z’s “great” politics turns out to be rather small in scale. And in 
these new political communities, as I will show, ruling, commanding, and 
lawgiving take on forms that are radically different from how they are typi-
cally understood in political philosophy.
This article is organized around the notion of self-overcoming for two 
reasons. First, and most importantly, in the quotation that provides the epi-
graph to this article Nietzsche himself connects the notion of “great politics” 
directly to his Z; and immediately following the quotation, he cites from the 
very section of the book entitled “On Self-Overcoming.” This suggests an 
intimate connection between the idea of a new “great politics,” Z as a whole, 
and the notion of “self-overcoming” in particular. Second, any reader of 
Nietzsche must respond to the challenge that his writing poses: Nietzsche’s 
writing often contains (seemingly) contradictory statements that are diffi-
cult to make sense of, and he expresses his thought in unusual formats such 
as aphorisms, riddles, stories, images, songs—this is especially relevant to 
a reading of Z.4 One way of responding to this methodological challenge 
is “to make manifest the (coherent) thrust” of Nietzsche’s project and use 
that “thrust” to guide one’s reading.5 I adopt a similar approach in present-
ing a reading of Nietzsche’s politics in Z that is centered on the notion of 
self-overcoming as the general “thrust” of that book.6 For both of these rea-
sons, I approach the various remarks with obvious political relevance that 
appear scattered throughout Z from the perspective of self-overcoming.
I begin by outlining Nietzsche’s understanding of self-overcoming, 
transformation, and creativity in the first section, where I highlight that the 
point of self-overcoming is not to get stuck in any particular state, rather 
than to arrive somewhere specific. The next section explores the tension 
between self-overcoming, most often associated with transformation on 
the level of the individual, and collective life. I argue that while Nietzsche 
understands the modern state as incompatible with self-overcoming, his 
description of ancient peoples should alert us to the fact that this incom-
patibility is not one between overcoming and collective life in general, but 
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specifically concerns the modern state. In the third section I take as my 
starting point Nietzsche’s hope that “new peoples” might emerge from those 
who have left the modern state behind in favor of self-overcoming. I exca-
vate how such a “new people” emerges from a bottom-up process, and what 
lawgiving might look like in this context. In the fourth section, I respond 
to a possible objection against my characterization of Nietzsche’s new peo-
ples as emerging in a bottom-up process by explicating his peculiar under-
standing of ruling and commanding. I argue that we should understand 
Nietzsche’s “bestowing virtue” as a novel form of political rule. Finally, in 
the fifth section, I refute the idea that Z contains a world-encompassing 
(or even world-dominating) notion of “great politics” by showing that such 
a reading is incompatible with and fails to make sense of the book’s cen-
tral notion of self-overcoming. I conclude by suggesting a reorientation of 
our overall approach to figuring out Nietzsche’s “great politics”: rather than 
reading into Z a notion of “great politics” derived from BGE, we should 
proceed the other way around.
The Life of Self-Overcoming
In this section I argue that we should not understand the kind of self-over-
coming and value-creating that Zarathustra has in mind as simply a matter 
of swapping one (old) set of (bad) values for another (new and better) set 
of values. In GM, Nietzsche suggests that we should evaluate our current 
values by asking whether they have “up to now obstructed or promoted 
human flourishing” (GM P:3). Flourishing, in turn, is identified with “the 
fullness, strength and will of life” (GM P:3). It is Nietzsche’s understanding 
of life itself, then, that is key to understanding why he suggests a revalu-
ation of all values. In its essence, we read in Z, life can be understood as 
“that which must always overcome itself” (Z II: “Self-Overcoming”). Thus 
if it is necessary that our values be attuned to the character of life itself, 
and if life is becoming and self-overcoming, then values that are in the ser-
vice of human flourishing must allow for overcoming. If to flourish means 
to overcome oneself, then no newly created values could possibly be con-
ceived as absolute; they themselves, in order to remain attuned to life and 
thus to allow for human flourishing, will have to be overcome again even-
tually. There can be no everlasting, “platonic” good or bad, as Zarathustra 
insists; all values “must overcome themselves out of themselves again and 
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again” (Z II: “Self-Overcoming”). What is good in the sense of enabling our 
flourishing today will eventually prevent us from doing so in the future, 
under changed parameters—unless it is itself subject to transformation. As 
will become clear later on, this has important consequences for the political 
implications of self-overcoming.
Zarathustra first suggests that it is in the nature of life to command and 
obey at the same time. Such obeying can take two different forms: either the 
living obeys its own “commands,” or it receives its commands from outside. 
But even in this latter case, it will seek to command elsewhere. The ten-
dency in the living always to command and obey at the same time is what 
Zarathustra calls its “will to power.” Life is expansive; it wants to grow and 
overcome in order to express its strength. I will return to the discussion of 
commanding later; for now, I shall merely highlight that when Nietzsche 
speaks of commanding here, he is not discussing people commanding and 
dominating other people. He is, rather, speaking of “the living” in general. 
This does not exclude the possibility of strength being embodied in a per-
son, but it certainly shouldn’t be equated with relations of power between 
people. Most importantly, it is the “will” that seeks dominance. But for a will 
to dominate, human beings don’t have to dominate each other.7 For my pres-
ent purpose, there is yet another aspect of commanding that is important: 
sooner or later, the commanding is itself bound to be confined by its own 
commands and its own creations. Nietzsche has a personified “life” appear 
in this section to give an account of itself; and it reveals that beyond obeying 
its own commands, “life” is also bound to revise and overcome whatever 
form it might take and whatever it might create. There is thus no final pur-
pose or goal inherent in the process of self-overcoming, and in the process 
of self-overcoming life necessarily proceeds on “crooked paths,” character-
ized by struggle and (self-)contradictions (Z II: “Self-Overcoming”).
Zarathustra sketches what we might understand as a “model” for self- 
overcoming in his first speech. In the tripartite metamorphosis presented 
there, spirit transforms itself from “camel” to “lion” to “child.” The first stage 
is one of willing submission to received values and norms: the camel-spirit 
is thus weighed down by its acceptance of given values. The lion-spirit turns 
against the values carried and perpetuated by the camel. In doing so, it opens 
up space to make room for creation. But in order for new values actually to 
be created, the lion-spirit must yet transform into a child-spirit. The cre-
ation of the child-stage, while building on this forceful critique of the given, 
is not in itself hard, determined, or domineering. The child-spirit is playful 
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and affirmative: “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, 
a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying” 
(Z I: “Three Metamorphoses”). Creating new values, bringing about change, 
is a “game” that moves us on from the lion’s mode of critique and “nay-say-
ing” toward affirmation. It is “innocent” and “forgetful” insofar as it departs 
from the current nexus of guilt—it goes beyond the good and evil of given 
values, leaving them behind to create new ones. That it is playful, a “wheel 
rolling out of itself,” implies that creating is not first and foremost interested 
in bringing about a particular end: it proceeds with lightheartedness and 
joyfulness.
In keeping with life’s very own impulse to contradict, contest, and over-
come whatever it creates, we should resist the temptation to understand this 
process as teleological: the “child” is not a final “goal” of self-overcoming. It 
does not make much sense to assume that we simply remain in this mode 
of playful creating. On the contrary, the very fact that the child creates val-
ues suggests that, in accordance with Nietzsche’s understanding of life, this 
entire process of metamorphoses is bound to recur over and over. The child 
plays with chance elements that come its way. But in this play it is a creative 
spirit: it creates new values, thus also new duties and a new “thou shalt.” And 
while these new values might be in the service of a flourishing life, eventu-
ally they will come to weigh down their creator again, who is thus bound to 
return to the camel-stage. This means that eventually all those who create 
new values for themselves will be compelled to reject these new values, too, 
and the process of self-overcoming and creating will begin again. The child-
stage is the most crucial stage in the process of self-overcoming insofar as 
it is the point at which a “new beginning” becomes possible. But the three 
parts of the metamorphosis of spirit all are different instances of the same 
process. I therefore suggest that we understand the progression from camel 
to lion to child as a perpetual metamorphosis, one that is less concerned 
with the attempt to be in the child-stage than it is with not getting stuck in 
any one of the stages that together constitute this metamorphosis.
The contrast between stagnation and conformity on the one hand, and 
overcoming and creativity on the other, runs through all of Z. The most 
fundamental problem Zarathustra confronts over the course of the book is 
that of a multitude of people who have lost not just the capacity, but also the 
desire to overcome their present state. And his most fundamental project is 
to reinvigorate this desire and capacity in those who are still capable of it, 
and to create new values that are attuned to the nature of life itself. In the 
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beginning of the book, Zarathustra introduces himself to the people in the 
marketplace as the teacher of the “Übermensch” with the following words: 
“Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to 
overcome him?” (Z I: Prologue). The Übermensch is conceived as a remedy 
to the ills of a society that, even though it does not believe in God anymore, 
remains bound to values that originate in Christianity and that stand in the 
way of a flourishing life.8 It is important to note, here, that instead of pic-
turing a concrete “ideal type” of the overman, Nietzsche invites us to turn 
toward a critique of humans in their current form, discerning those aspects 
that inhibit their flourishing and developing contempt for them so as to 
be motivated to overcome them. It is the critical analysis of present condi-
tions that Zarathustra hopes might compel the people on the marketplace 
to become creators. Implied in the notion of the overman is not an ideal we 
should strive for, but a call for continuous transformation. Just as it would 
go against the nature of life to think that any values we create would be 
everlasting, so the overman cannot be understood as a new form of life that, 
once created, remains static. In the remainder of this article, I excavate from 
Z suggestions about how the process of continuous self-overcoming might 
translate into a new politics of collective self-overcoming and creating.
Self-Overcoming and the Modern State
As I have shown above, self-overcoming has no concrete positive goal. But 
Nietzsche gives us clear indications of what would stand in its way: anything 
that disallows the reconfiguration of given values and forms of life. And 
those elements Nietzsche identifies as inhibiting our flourishing can ulti-
mately be traced back to a demand for conformity, which leads to stagnation 
and the loss of creative energies. Of course, Christian morality and moral 
values derived therefrom are of central importance here. But rather than 
examining his critique of Christian morality, I briefly turn to Nietzsche’s 
critique of the state and of the marketplace. This will elucidate the political 
impetus of Z, for Nietzsche sees church and state as similar institutions: 
the church, he explains, is “a kind of state” (Z II: “Great Events”). Both are 
understood to institute and enforce conformity and stifle our will to power, 
and are thus fundamentally opposed to creating. While it might seem, then, 
that Nietzsche finds self-overcoming to be incompatible with political life 
in general, I will show that this incompatibility is specifically geared to 
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the modern state by way of discussing Nietzsche’s positive assessment of 
ancient peoples.
Both the church and the state strive to speak for everyone; both are 
institutions with a claim to universality. Both prescribe norms and duties, 
and determine our sense of justice. Nietzsche suggests that the state has 
replaced the “old God” as our “new idol” (Z I: “New Idol”). Where once God 
provided rules of conduct, a firm notion of good and bad, and a sense of 
appropriate punishment for transgressions, now the state does. Nietzsche’s 
critique of the state and its political culture in Z is not particularly elab-
orate. He decries the conformity of thought stemming from measuring 
excellence in terms of money, office, or title. He mocks the “swift mon-
keys” who “scramble all over each other” in a desperate attempt to get to a 
position of power. As the “crowbar of power,” wealth is a central concern 
within the state, and the effect of accumulating material wealth is people’s 
impoverishment. The culmination and embodiment of the above life form 
are those Zarathustra describes as the “last human beings.” They are inter-
ested only in their own comfort, security, and happiness—a state of being 
where everyone is content with what is, and there is no conflict, no desire, 
no hardship (Z I: Prologue). Such a collective resignation of any impulse 
toward difference and resistance, of course, is the absolute antipode to will-
ing and creating the new: the last human beings do not desire to change 
anything about their mediocre existence.
Those who found states, according to Nietzsche, are not creators but 
“annihilators”; the state’s order is based on “sword” and “a hundred crav-
ings,” that is, force and deprivation. There is nothing that actively connects 
people in the state, no community, we might say. As a way of responding to 
such estrangement, the state attempts to employ creators for its own benefit 
(Z I: “New Idol”). To the creators, Zarathustra suggests staying away from 
those influential within the state, from their fame and the way the people 
“revolve around” them (Z I: “Flies”). They should not seek influence within 
the state or waste their energy on improving it. Even less should they seek 
the material wealth around which the state is organized. Nietzsche recom-
mends a “small poverty”: to have fewer possessions means that one is also 
less possessed by the state, and thus less subjected to the present order (Z I: 
“New Idol”). Finally, creators should leave state and marketplace behind 
and seek solitude.
The overman, Zarathustra suggests, can begin only “where the state 
ends” (Z I: “New Idol”). The path of self-overcoming is not (yet) compatible 
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with collective life, and certainly not realizable by engaging in state politics. 
But while the process of self-overcoming is clearly based on solitude and 
on withdrawal from the state, it is not clear that this means that one must 
withdraw to one’s cave and live as a hermit. Zarathustra himself never does: 
he repeatedly retreats from company, but he only ever does so temporarily. 
That he retreats into solitude when he encounters obstacles in the process of 
overcoming suggests that solitude is most importantly a space for thought 
and for taking critical distance from one’s own self. But the “self ” that cre-
ators engage in thought and seek to overcome is of course a socialized self. It 
is the same self whose emergence Nietzsche describes in the second essay of 
his GM, and elements of which now are rejected in much the same fashion 
in which the lion rejects the values that the camel carried into its desert. 
Given that solitude is part of the process of revaluating our values, and that 
values in turn are understood by Nietzsche to be inherently social and his-
torical (both in their genesis and in their effects), it seems to me plausible 
that Zarathustra’s recommending solitude should be understood not as a 
final state but rather as an element in the process of self-overcoming.9 He 
advocates solitude not as an alternative to living with others, but as part of 
a process that overcomes the modern state and mass society and allows for 
new forms of collectivity to emerge.
Beyond his critique of the social, cultural, and moral shortcomings of 
the modern state and the life-forms it inspires, Nietzsche also addresses its 
genesis. In fact, the entire discussion of the modern state begins by contrast-
ing “states” with “peoples and herds,” that is, ancient forms of communal 
life. Nietzsche insists that in the past, “peoples were creators and only later 
individuals; indeed, the individual himself is still the youngest creation” 
(Z I: “Thousand and One Goals,” my emphasis).10 According to Nietzsche, 
what fundamentally characterized the ancient “peoples” he so clearly pre-
ferred over the modern state’s mass society, and what set them apart from 
the latter, is that they were acting collectively, rather than behaving in a con-
formist manner. Their values and their laws were the result of “their over-
comings” and “their will to power,” and thus of their own creative deeds. 
As Nietzsche emphasizes, humans are fundamentally creatures who value 
and esteem, and to esteem and value at the same time is to create. Humans 
did not “find” their values, they did not discover them by accident: they 
actively created them. The creative deeds of peoples in turn depend on their 
specific “need and land and sky and neighbor,” that is, on their material and 
relational circumstances. Thus, Nietzsche argues, there was great variance 
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between peoples (Z I: “Thousand and One Goals”). Structured by their own 
“customs and rights,” notions of good and bad vary between different peo-
ples (Z I: “New Idol”).
Insofar as Nietzsche believes that ancient peoples such as the Greeks 
and Persians had a more active sense of authorship regarding the laws and 
values that guided their collective life, by Nietzsche’s own standard they 
therefore led more flourishing lives in the sense spelled out above: their 
values were attuned to life and life’s specific demands at a given point in 
time, and they were ready to change with those demands. Thus, while cre-
ating is presently very much dependent on individuals and their episodes 
of chosen solitude, it seems that this is not necessarily true of overcoming 
and creating at all times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a temporal or his-
torical dimension to Nietzsche’s reflections regarding creating in Z: It is in 
the present state of affairs—in a modern world of nation-states and mass 
culture, to be precise—that Nietzsche finds it necessary to withdraw into 
solitude as part of the process of creating of new values. Here lies the key to 
understanding how Nietzsche conceives of the solitary self-overcoming that 
is at the center of the book as a basis for a politics of the future: Overcoming 
and creating today may depend on solitude, since it provides creators with 
critical distance from received values of modern societies. But that does 
not mean that overcoming won’t become a collective process once again, if 
circumstances change. Just as overcoming and creating once was a collective 
task for ancient peoples, so it might be once again in newly emerging peo-
ples that constitute themselves beyond the modern state.
Nietzsche’s New Peoples: “Founding” and “Lawgiving”
The most urgent question citizens of the modern state pose themselves is 
how to make their lives comfortable, pleasant, and secure for the greatest 
possible number; they have no interest in changing or even just questioning 
their current values and forms of life. Very fittingly, then, Nietzsche pro-
poses that we move away from the question posed by the “rulers of today” 
within the modern state: “How are human beings to be preserved?” This 
is of course precisely the question that, since Hobbes, has become the first 
question of liberal political thought. Nietzsche suggests that instead we 
begin to ask, “How shall human being be overcome?” (Z IV: “Higher Man”). 
Thus he expands his notion of self-overcoming to the political sphere and 
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positions it against a politics of preservation.11 How can we make sense of 
Zarathustra’s revaluation as the orienting question for his “great politics”? 
In the context of two crucial sections—the very last part of the first book, 
“On the Bestowing Virtue,” and again toward the end of the third book, “On 
Old and New Tablets”—Nietzsche suggests the emergence of future new 
peoples. Given that ancient peoples seemed to have been genuinely capa-
ble of self-overcoming, it makes sense that a transformed version of such 
ancient exemplars provides the basis for a positive model of future commu-
nities contained in Z, both to mark a departure from the modern state and 
for the active and creative characteristics of ancient peoples. In this section, 
I turn to the question of how Nietzsche envisions the founding of such new 
peoples and the creating of values—or, to speak in the idiom of political 
philosophy, lawgiving—as a collective process rather than a solitary one.
A new people would emerge from a process of overcoming analogous 
to that described in the “Three Metamorphoses”: its starting point is the 
lion-spirited critique of the modern state and rejection of its values and 
forms of life. This rejection requires solitude; it requires that creators leave 
state and marketplace behind to make space for critical distance. But one 
day, Nietzsche suggests, those scattered points of critical resistance, the 
“lonely” and “withdrawing ones” of his day, might themselves come to con-
stitute a people: “from you who have chosen yourselves a chosen people 
shall grow—and from them the overman” (Z I: “Bestowing Virtue”). There 
are three important things to note in this description. First, and fundamen-
tally, Nietzsche’s “new people” emerges from the bottom up rather than 
being the willed plan of some leader or lawgiver. It is those who have “cho-
sen themselves,” who have chosen the path of self-overcoming, from whom 
such a people would organically “grow.” Thus Nietzsche envisions an ethical 
self-transformation that precedes the emergence of a new people. Second, 
this bottom-up movement does not stop with the founding of a new people. 
Rather, the newly founded collectivity is itself merely the initiation of a per-
petual self-overcoming such as is embodied in the overman.
There is a third point, though, that I want to emphasize here: namely 
that this new people is self-selected. That is, no one is excluded from taking 
part, even though it is clear that Nietzsche thinks most people would be 
neither willing nor able to go through the prerequisite process.12 But it is 
important to note that there is no formal or political exclusion whatsoever 
that is barring people from taking part if they select themselves for this task. 
In fact, it seems that Nietzsche maintains a faint hope that others might 
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eventually be able and willing to join: Those who are able to create today 
can act as “physicians” in the hope to help the “sick” who are living in the 
confines of the state (and therefore lack creative vitality). Their medicine, 
however, is not one that the physicians spoon-feed to the sick, but one that 
works through examples: it is by allowing the “sick” to observe how one may 
heal oneself that the physicians can help them (Z I: “Bestowing Virtue”). 
Rather than actively trying to assist them—which would only further their 
dependence on others, and hence their sickness—it is the role of physi-
cians to inspire the sick to help themselves. While this implies a sense of 
avant-gardism, which might be taken to imply inequality, a new people such 
as Nietzsche envisions it certainly does not rest on any structural inequality.
Since they are constituted by fellow creators, any potential “rank-ordering” 
within these new peoples will have to be up for contestation. Zarathustra iden-
tifies creators as a “new nobility”: they “create new things and a new virtue” 
(Z I: “Tree on the Mountain”). He clearly positions this “new nobility” in oppo-
sition not just to the “rabble” of the marketplace, but to moneyed aristocracy, 
too; and importantly, he characterizes his new nobility as an adversary of “all 
despotic rule.” He further insists that there must be “many kinds of noble ones 
for nobility to exist”—nobility requires plurality and difference (Z III: “Old and 
New Tablets”). If we take this notion of a “new nobility” to ground Nietzsche’s 
politics, such politics will differ significantly from our common understanding 
of “aristocratic” politics.13 Nietzsche’s new nobility is about a mode of doing 
and a way of being in the world, and, again, it has precious little in common 
with how we are accustomed to use this term in political philosophy.
The kind of transformed community envisioned is constituted by 
the previous “withdrawing ones,” by creators. It might thus seem that in 
such a community each individual gives herself her own values and laws, 
and hangs her own tablets over herself, as creators are wont to do. But 
since Nietzsche suggests that creating once was a collective process (Z I: 
“Self-Overcoming”), it is more plausible to think that once a new people 
emerges, the process of creating new tablets would once more turn into 
a collective one, where all creators create together. How, then, might the 
process of lawgiving work in the context of a “new people” of creators? “A 
Thousand and One Goals” does not mention a lawgiver but rather seems to 
suggest equality among the creators, such that a new people “grows” out of 
their deeds rather than originating in an act of lawgiving. In his discussion 
of ancient peoples, by contrast, Nietzsche had suggested that creators “cre-
ated peoples” by hanging “a faith and a love over them,” which sounds more 
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like a traditional act of lawgiving (Z I: “New Idol”). I will now turn to “On 
Old and New Tablets” to examine whether and in what sense Zarathustra 
himself can be understood as a lawgiver in the sense in which this figure 
is often alluded to in political philosophy, and what a process of collective 
creating and lawgiving might look like in his vision for a future politics.
In the beginning of this section, Zarathustra is presented as removed 
from the people themselves, a familiar setting for lawgivers in the imagery of 
political philosophy. Surrounded by shattered “old tablets,” which represent 
values that have been overcome or at least have lost credibility, he undertakes 
to write new ones. But some aspects of the story complicate viewing him as 
a lawgiver in the conventional sense. First, the new tablets around him are 
only “partially written upon,” and Zarathustra sits among them, waiting for 
his “hour” to come so that he may return to mankind (Z III: “Old and New 
Tablets”). That they are not fully written might suggest that for its comple-
tion, the process of lawgiving depends on Zarathustra having returned to 
mankind first. Perhaps most instructive regarding the process of lawgiving 
is a later section in the same chapter. It is worth quoting in full here:
Whoever has become wise about ancient origins will surely, in 
the end, seek new sources of the future and new origins. Yes my 
brothers, it will not be overly long and new peoples will origi-
nate and new sources will roar down into new depths. An earth-
quake, after all—it buries many wells, it causes much dying of 
thirst: it also brings to light inner powers and secrets. An earth-
quake reveals new sources. In an earthquake of ancient peoples 
new sources break out. And whoever cries out there: “Look, here 
is a fountain for many who thirst, a heart for many who long, 
a will for many tools”—around him gathers a people, that is: 
many who try. Who can command, who must obey—here it is 
tried! Indeed, with what long searching and guessing and lack of 
success and learning and trying again! Human society: it is an 
experiment, this I teach—a long search: but it searches for the 
commander!—an experiment, oh my brothers! And not a “con-
tract!” Break, break me such words of the soft hearted and half-
and-halfs! (Z III: “Old and New Tablets,” translation altered)
Zarathustra here describes the founding of new peoples as constituted by 
several elements: First of all, there are “earthquakes” that both bury old 
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wells, and lay bare new sources for new wells. Recall that “a convulsion of 
earthquakes” was one of the elements of “great politics” Nietzsche mentions 
in the quotation from EH, given as an epigraph to this article. The “wells” 
in the quotation from Z stand in for values and tablets such as are able to 
bestow vitality to a people and thus allow it to flourish. That these emerge as 
a result of earthquakes suggests the sudden eruption, the sudden becoming 
visible of an extremely slow process that was hitherto hidden from plain 
sight. These earthquakes must include both the increasingly widespread 
insight that current values stand in the way of flourishing and the prepara-
tory work of a revaluation of values by creators in their solitude.
There are two long-term movements, which together constitute the 
requirement for new sources to become visible. First, the increasing obso-
lescence of current values for a flourishing life; and second, the search of 
some to rid themselves of these values. Together, these movements con-
stitute the requirement for new sources to become visible. And based on 
this,  then, there are those who actually discover these new sources, and 
 proclaim them as sources suitable to sustain the lives of those around them. 
That is, they make these new sources visible to others as “a fountain for 
many who thirst, a heart for many who long, a will for many tools.” But a 
new people is constituted only when those others, too, find the new sources 
suitable. New tablets are thus not enacted for them, on behalf of them, but 
they themselves have to affirm and hang them over themselves. Thus it may 
well be just one or a few creators who discover a set of new values suited 
to a new people; but they would not then go on to impose them on oth-
ers. Rather, such values would have to correspond to a preexisting “thirst,” 
an actual desire in others that emerges out of and changes with their own 
self-overcomings. It is affection toward a set of values that truly are their 
own, and that they can recognize as their own, that may bring creators 
together to form a people.
After having suggested a shift from “preserving” to “overcoming” 
humankind as the first political question, Nietzsche furthermore introduces 
his second revaluation of a fundamental conceptual resource in political 
philosophy in this paragraph: he insists that we should understand society 
not as a “contract,” that is, as something that rests on a (fictional) agreement 
of all to certain terms and conditions, but rather as an “experiment.” Peoples 
are constituted by “many who try” to be creators. This means that the 
“many” are active constituents of any such people, that they are active in the 
process of developing values and of governing. It further emphasizes that 
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the structure of rule in such new peoples is continually up for contestation 
and negotiation: “Who can command, who must obey—here it  is  tried!” 
The authority of any given tablet of values does not extend beyond the 
point where it ceases to be in the service of a flourishing life. With Daniel 
Conway, we might imagine a people of creators as constituted by a “political 
microsphere” that constitutes its “vital core,” engendering their legislations, 
and a “macrosphere” that “extends outward as an involuntary, spontaneous 
outgrowth” of these legislations.14 It is not clear whether Nietzsche thinks 
such an experimental, agonistic community would give itself a government 
in the traditional sense and a constitution to ground a stable institutional 
framework at all. Given Z’s critique of the state and its emphasis on con-
tinuous overcoming, we might well think that it would not. But if it did, 
such a constitution would first and foremost have to safeguard the ability 
of creators actively to contest their current values and radically to change 
them. They would have to be able at any time to change and overcome their 
current form of government, as well as replace those that are currently in 
charge of it. A collective process of creating cannot be understood as “con-
sensus-finding” or as any kind of (lasting) agreement—Nietzsche’s political 
vision is radically agonistic.15
Teaching, Commanding, and Political Rule
A possible objection against understanding the founding of new peoples 
as a bottom-up process is that for Nietzsche to endorse such a view would 
seem to be in tension with his positive references to ruling and command-
ing throughout the book. Having elaborated on the question of founding 
and lawgiving of Z’s new peoples, I therefore turn to these concepts next 
to argue that once we properly understand what they mean to Nietzsche, 
we can see that there is no contradiction between an endorsement of com-
manding on the one hand, and a bottom-up conception of politics on the 
other. Once more, Nietzsche revalues our common understanding of com-
manding and ruling.
As discussed in the first section of this article, the first transforma-
tion of the notion of commanding comes as part of the discussion of self- 
overcoming and life as will to power: there, Nietzsche had suggested that 
commanding and obeying are both intrinsically intertwined. Throughout Z 
as a whole, the things and people that are described as “commanding” are 
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extremely diverse. Of course, Zarathustra himself occasionally commands. 
But beyond this, Nietzsche mentions the body, the will, faith, great love, 
the stillest hour, thoughts that come on the feet of doves, chance, the sky 
above—all of which “command” in one way or the other, and some of which, 
such as the “stillest hour,” are described as commanding Zarathustra. I can-
not address all of the different instances of commanding here; instead I will 
focus on Zarathustra’s general comportment as a commander, a teacher, an 
authority figure—and his rejection of all of these positions—as well as on 
the “stillest hour’s” elaborations on the kind of commanding appropriate to 
someone like Zarathustra.
Zarathustra explicitly and repeatedly refuses authority over others.  The 
indeterminateness of his “ideal”—self-overcoming and creating—corresponds 
directly to his comportment as a “teacher”: he is unwilling to become the 
leader of a movement, much less a political party. And indeed, it would be dif-
ficult to imagine anyone formulating a manual or program for how to achieve 
a goal as radically indeterminate as “self-overcoming” or the “Übermensch.” 
Neither of them are teachable goals that refer to a concrete and knowable con-
tent. Accordingly, rather than instructing others in what to do, Zarathustra 
first and foremost seeks to inspire others in their own journeys. He asks of 
his students to be his companions, “fellow creators,” rather than his disciples. 
As his students, they can only follow him in the attempt at self-overcoming 
insofar as they follow themselves. Everyone must “write new values on new 
tablets” on their own (Z I: Prologue). Zarathustra himself finds his path by 
“trying and questioning,” and those seeking to overcome themselves likewise 
must find their own paths, because “the way,” that is, a universally applicable 
path toward self-overcoming, simply “does not exist!” (Z III: “Old and New 
Tablets”). Zarathustra even advises his fellow creators not to follow his lead, to 
walk away and guard themselves against him (Z I: “Bestowing Virtue”). So he 
is not much of a leader to begin with, and he repeatedly abandons his friends. 
Toward the end of the second book, right before he leaves them once more, 
he suggests that it was his “stillest hour” who commanded him to leave his 
friends behind—and precisely because he refuses to “command and lead the 
way commanding” (Z II: “Stillest Hour”).
As his personified “stillest hour” insists, what is “needed most by every-
one” is the one “who commands great things.” The stillest hour therefore 
critiques Zarathustra for having the necessary power to rule while lack-
ing the desire to do so. Zarathustra replies to this that he “lack[s] the lion’s 
voice for all commanding,” suggesting that he finds himself incapable 
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of commanding others by employing the same forceful determination 
involved in the lion’s rejection of given values. The stillest hour, however, 
brushes this objection away by insisting, “The stillest words are those that 
bring the storm. Thoughts that come on the feet of doves steer the world. 
Oh Zarathustra, you shall go as a shadow of that which must come; thus 
you will command and lead the way commanding” (Z II: “Stillest Hour”). 
It seems, then, that Zarathustra misunderstood what was asked of him. The 
kind of commanding that the stillest hour suggests is far from prescribing 
rules and norms to others, and further even from forcefully dominating 
them. It is not a “lion’s voice” that is needed to command, not a vigorous 
assertion of power over others, but stillness. Thoughts such as are capable 
of bringing a “storm” to the world and “steer” it in a new direction arrive 
quietly, perhaps without people noticing at first. Thus it seems that it is pre-
cisely in Zarathustra’s refusal to rule, in his stillness and in proceeding on 
the path of creation, that his stillest hour anticipates he might institute a 
larger, structural change—as a “shadow” of future possibilities.
Nietzsche discusses the difference between the “commanding” appro-
priate to Zarathustra’s project of overcoming humankind and the kind of 
rule typically associated with state politics explicitly in his critique of the 
marketplace. There, the opposition is expressed through the distinction 
between creators on the one side, and “actors” and “performers” on the other. 
Whereas it is the latter around whom the people of the marketplace “revolve,” 
creators, the “inventors of new values,” instead have the entire world “invis-
ibly” revolving around them (Z I: “Flies”). It is the “pressing” types that 
inhabit the state who desire to have others follow them. Zarathustra him-
self had attempted and then rejected a somewhat similar approach when 
trying to motivate the people on the marketplace to self-overcoming at the 
very beginning of the book.16 Later, he explicitly advises creators not to 
collaborate with the actors of the marketplace, even though we might think 
that this would give creators a certain influence over the people. But the 
kind of commanding that Z envisions is not one that decides for others 
how the world is to be evaluated, and what is to be done. As Zarathustra 
experienced on the marketplace, you cannot “command” people to live a 
flourishing and creative life unless they themselves are already disposed to 
such a life, unless they feel a longing for such a life. Likewise, as seen in the 
founding of new peoples, you can well point out a source for new tablets, 
but you cannot decide for others to adopt a new tablet. As Vanessa Lemm 
aptly puts it, “what makes a deed great is its reception by a people.”17 To 
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“command,” then, does not mean to assert domination over others by force; 
it means to find the world revolving around oneself—or, more precisely, 
revolving around a thought (Z II: “Stillest Hour”) or a value (Z I: “Flies”) 
created—even though, or perhaps because, one does not intend for this to 
happen, and even though one does not have any desire to rule.18
That many lust after power out of a desire for fame and public admi-
ration is part of Zarathustra’s critique of the modern state and its politi-
cal culture. But he further proceeds to revalue our understanding of the 
“lust to rule,” rather than becoming weary of rulers altogether.19 In “On the 
Three Evils” he describes lust to rule as cruel; it “breaks and breaks open 
everything rotten and hollow” and teaches “cities and empires” to develop 
contempt for themselves and to wish for their own end. Most importantly, 
if and when it is “the high” that “longs downward for power,” we should not 
think of this kind of ruling as “lusting after” power and rule. Rather, it is 
perfectly appropriate to the nature of “the high” (Z III: “Three Evils”). Here 
I should like to emphasize that “the” high is a translation of “das Hohe,” 
indicating not a person as ruler but a something—presumably a thought, a 
value, a virtue. The proper name for such kind of rule, as Nietzsche insists, 
is that of “the bestowing virtue” rather than “lust to rule.” The chapter “On 
the Bestowing Virtue,” to which Zarathustra refers with this revaluation, 
adds to its new understanding. A bestowing virtue is mild, not predatory; 
it is indifferent to utility; it takes away (old values) because it seeks to give;  
it originates in love; it “serves the meaning of the earth.” Such a “new virtue” 
is itself “power” and “a ruling thought.” As Nietzsche further suggests, it is 
a “river” that can be both “a blessing and a danger to adjacent dwellers”—it 
can quench their thirst, but it can also wash them away with it. Since all of 
this is discussed in the chapter in which Zarathustra first suggests the future 
emergence of a new people, it seems to me obvious that “the bestowing 
virtue” is what replaces conventional forms of political rule in those new 
peoples (Z I: “Bestowing Virtue”). Thus Nietzsche’s critique of rule in the 
modern state does not mean that his position is incompatible with political 
rule per se.
While much more could be said, I do hope that Nietzsche’s central 
insight about commanding has become clear: What commands or rules is 
not a human being seeking influence in the world, but rather a thought or 
a virtue. It is in the nature of such a virtue, insofar as it is powerful, that 
it finds itself shaping the world. This reading thus supports Maudemarie 
Clark’s judgment that “the vision of philosophers dominating people by 
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imposing their values on them, either directly or by means of a political 
elite” is “too silly for words.”20 Of course, in BGE Nietzsche famously does 
insist that “true philosophers” are always “commanders and legislators” 
(BGE 211). But by attending to the revaluation of the ideas of “command-
ing” and “legislating” introduced in Z, we can see in what precise sense 
the imposition of values by a political philosopher elite is indeed silly: For 
Nietzsche, true commanding does not require or even allow for a forceful 
imposition on others. Commanding implies a giving, obeying, and loving 
relationship, even though for some it can be overpowering.
Whither “Great” Politics?
In this last section, I turn directly to the question of “great politics.” While 
the term itself does not appear in Z, some commentators have taken the 
last lines from “On a Thousand and One Goals” to express the ambitions of 
Nietzsche’s “great politics”:
A thousand goals there have been until now, for there have been 
a thousand peoples. Only the fetters for the thousand necks are 
still missing, the one goal is missing. Humanity still has no goal. 
But tell me, my brothers: if humanity still lacks a goal, does it 
not also still lack—humanity itself?— (Z I: “Thousand and One 
Goals”)
Laurence Lampert, for instance, suggests that we have here the “welding” 
of mankind into “a single people” by a “supreme act” of the overman that 
promises to deliver a “universal system of harmony or historic necessity” 
which they hitherto lacked. I agree with Lampert that it is unlikely that 
Nietzsche had a “return to ancestral ways” in mind when speaking of 
the possibility for a new people of creators. But it is even less likely that 
Nietzsche would conceive of such a new people as a forceful “welding” into 
one uniform mass of humanity, which is now bound to follow the prescrip-
tions of “the superman.”21 This is entirely incompatible with Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on creating, self-overcoming, and self-legislating throughout the 
book, and with his revaluation of what it means to command. It also goes 
against the notion of the self-selection of those who instantiate new peo-
ples. As Nietzsche very clearly states, they are not welded together—they 
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constitute themselves. In a more subtle interpretation, Gooding-Williams 
suggests that “On a Thousand and One Goals” constitutes “what Nietzsche 
later calls great politics,” that is, “the advent of a new caste of a new- 
values-creating philosophers” for a “global politics,” but hastens to add that 
“nothing in [Nietzsche’s] concept of new-values creation rules out the possi-
bility of a new-values creator who declined to dedicate himself to the aims 
of ‘great politics.’”22 Thus Gooding-Williams finds it necessary to separate 
what he takes Nietzsche to suggest here (a global great politics) from an 
alternative that might also follow from and presumably redeem Nietzsche’s 
own concepts.
Neither Lampert nor Gooding-Williams reflects on the ambiguity of 
Z’s formulation “if humanity still lacks a goal, does it not also still lack—
humanity itself?” This formulation could have two implications: It could 
express Zarathustra’s longing for a “goal for humanity” so that, finally, 
humanity might come to exist. But it could also mean that, because there 
are thousands of peoples and thousands of different conceptions of good 
and evil and thus thousands of different goals, it simply does not make 
much sense to speak of “humanity” as one singular entity at all. It is not 
clear whether Nietzsche truly entertains the possibility that we might in 
the future come to exist as humanity for the first time, or whether his point 
is to critique the notion of humanity as implying a uniting, universal goal 
for diverse peoples. That humanity apparently “still lacks humanity” might 
simply mean that there is no humanity, that this notion as such is absurd 
and that that is acceptable, or good, or just something to which we have to 
be resigned. Goals, values, striving, creating—these could then exist only in 
locally specific forms.
But suppose Lampert and Gooding-Williams are right, and these lines 
indicate Zarathustra’s wish to give humanity a single goal: What could such 
a goal look like if it is to make sense of Z’s project of overcoming? A plau-
sible answer might be that the thought of overcoming itself could be this 
“single goal.” After all, Zarathustra “commands” this “highest” thought to 
his friends, and he also suggests that it replace our traditional focus on col-
lective self-preservation (Z I: “New Idol”; IV: “Higher Man”). But if this 
thought itself were the “unifying goal” for humanity, such a goal would 
again lack concrete content—it would not tell us what to do or what not to 
do, it would merely tell us to overcome what is. If our goal is to overcome 
ourselves continuously, then any concrete purpose, value, or goal whatso-
ever to emerge at a given historical moment will itself subsequently have 
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to be overcome. Thus to orient collective life toward this thought does not 
mean to establish, pace Lampert, a “universal system of harmony or historic 
necessity” among humankind.23 On the contrary, overcoming depends on 
“contradictions” between the living; that is, it depends on disharmony and 
struggle (Z II: “Tarantulas”).
As I have sought to show in this article, the politics that Z suggests is far 
from “great” in the sense of containing a program of “world domination” or 
“pan-European politics.” The book concerns itself mostly with the transfor-
mation of individuals, with their self-overcoming and the creating of new 
values. The motivation for such transformation originates on the one hand 
in an insight into the nature of life itself as continuous overcoming; on the 
other hand, it responds to a felt social, political, and cultural crisis. Z does 
not propose a political program as a remedy to the problems it diagno-
ses: the kind of transformation Nietzsche advocates there is fundamentally 
incompatible with understanding politics as the implementation of a pro-
gram for the future. As a precondition for developing new forms of com-
munity, it first of all focuses on the necessary resistance to the homogenizing 
effect of modern political culture, mass society, the modern state, and their 
calls for unquestioned obedience. It is “small” insofar as the book suggests 
that we leave the state behind us and that only then, based on a decentralized 
process of individual and local attempts at creating, new forms of collective 
life may emerge. Since such “new peoples” would be made up of creators, 
that is, of individuals who are capable of self-overcoming, their mode of 
lawgiving will be different from familiar models in political thought. The 
first goal of these new forms of collective life is not to preserve but rather to 
overcome humankind in whatever its present state might be. Accordingly, 
this is a society based on experiments, on the continuous contestation of 
existing values, and not on a “social contract.” That is, it is agonist in charac-
ter, it requires struggle and disagreement, and any values, norms, and laws 
within it are continuously up for transformation. It is a society of creators, 
who for Nietzsche form a new nobility—not a nobility by birth or wealth, 
but based on whether or not someone is willing and capable to overcome 
themselves and create values; finally, the character of commanding and rul-
ing here is far from the familiar liberal models of political rule, and without 
coercion of others.
I conclude by raising a question regarding Nietzsche’s Z, (great) poli-
tics, and Nietzsche’s oeuvre as a whole. Those interested in Nietzsche’s pol-
itics tend to read back into Z a notion of “great politics” derived from BGE 
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(e.g., Lampert, Gooding-Williams, and Detwiler). But if my understanding 
of Z as a revaluation of the foundational categories of political philosophy 
is at all correct, then this approach is problematic. It would mean to read 
a book that seeks to revalue traditional categories of political thought—to 
create new concepts for new tasks and a transformed notion of politics 
itself—through the lens of a book that (mostly) comments on the polit-
ical developments of its day and age. When Nietzsche himself reflects on 
the relation between the two texts, he insists that while Z constitutes the 
“yea-saying” part of his project, BGE should be understood as its “no-saying, 
no-doing” counterpart (EH “Books: BGE” 1). After the “squandering of 
goodness” of Z, with its “need to see into the distance,” Nietzsche in BGE is 
“forced to focus on things that are closest to it, the age, our surroundings” 
(EH “Books: BGE” 2). This suggests that both books relate to each other like 
lion and child in the process of overcoming: one of them critiques and rejects 
the present, while the other is concerned with creating; one remains bound 
by its present, while the other is capable of going beyond it. It is thus some-
what surprising that so many commentators seek to construe Nietzsche’s 
own, affirmative vision of politics by drawing on BGE more than his Z.24 
This might simply be because the former clearly operates within the idiom 
of political philosophy and international politics, while Z’s politics is both 
tentative and fragmentary. But if anything, would it not make more sense to 
draw on Nietzsche’s revaluations of political concepts in his Z to guide our 
reading of BGE, rather than proceeding the other way around?
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1. This article refers to the following translations of Nietzsche’s work: Beyond 
Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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2002); Ecce Homo, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Adrian del Caro (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
2. There is a general tendency in Nietzsche scholarship concerned with his pol-
itics either to read him as proposing some sort of “aristocratic” or elitist power pol-
itics (Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999]; Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]; Hugo Drochon, Nietzsche’s Great 
Politics [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016]), or to approach him 
from the perspective of (generally, agonist or radical) democratic theory (William 
Connolly, Political Theory & Modernity [Oxford: Blackwell, 1989]; Bonnie Honig, 
Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1993]; Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought [Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1988]). But if Nietzsche’s point is precisely to revalue our political values 
and categories, such framings might not be very helpful. Another strand of com-
mentators take Nietzsche’s uneasy fit within the recognized traditions of political 
thought, and his refusal to comply with the methodological presuppositions taken 
as foundational to political philosophy, as grounds to argue that he simply can-
not be described as a political philosopher at all. Bernard Williams, for instance, 
maintains that to have a “coherent politics” would require Nietzsche to develop 
“a coherent set of opinions about the ways in which power should be exercised in 
modern societies, with what limitations and to what ends” (Shame and Necessity 
[Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008], 10). Williams is right: Nietzsche 
does not have a political philosophy or a coherent politics in either of these senses. 
But this does not mean that his Z, for instance, is merely a book on culture, values, 
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